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I.

INTRODUCTION

Product liability lawsuits often coincide with governmental
regulatory activities. Products at issue in litigation, for example,
may also be or have been the targets of inquiries or investigations
by regulators.1 Foreign regulators also may investigate product
safety issues prior to, or during the course of litigation. In the
European Union, for example, the Directive on General Product
2
Safety governs issues of product safety.
Information pertaining to agencies' regulatory functions is often sought .by product liability
litigants
as
evidence
to support or re3
•
4
•
5
•6
fute evidence of defect, causation, notice,' or industry standard.
1. U.S. agencies whose work product has been mentioned in the product
liability caselaw include, among others, the Consumer Product Safety Commission.
E.g., Kehm v. Procter & Gamble Mfg., 724 F.2d 779 (8th Cir. 1984); Kontz v. KMart Corp., 712 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1983); the National Highway Traffic Safety
Commission, e.g., Graham v. Ryerson, 292 N.W.2d 704 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980); Nakajima v. Gen. Motors Corp., 857 F. Supp. 100 (D.D.C. 1994); the Food and Drug
Administration, e.g., Sabel v. Mead Johnson & Co., 737 F. Supp. 135 (D. Mass.
1990); the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, e.g., Culinary Foods,
Inc. v. Raychem Corp., 150 F.R.D. 122 (N.D. Ill. 1993); the Federal Aviation Administration, the Coast Guard, e.g., Puerto Rico Ports Authority v. M/V Manhattan
Prince, 894 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1990); and even the Bureau of Mines, e.g., Miller v.
Caterpillar Tractor Co., 697 F.2d 141 (6th Cir. 1983).
2.
Council Directive 92/59/E.E.C. of 29 June 1992 on General Product
Safety.
3. E.g., Cohen v. Gen. Motors Corp., 534 F. Supp. 509 (W.D. Mo. 1982)
(admitting a NHTSA investigation report that had concluded the General Motors
product at issue was not defective).
4. E.g., In re Nautilus Motor Tanker Co., 85 F.3d 105 (3rd Cir. 1996) (admitting a Coast Guard report that included a comment on causation).
5. E.g., Whittley v. City of Meridian, 530 So. 2d 1341 (Miss. 1988) (admitting
a CPSC letter and publication, which had alerted the city to a potential threat to
children created by refuse bins at issue in the litigation, to rebut the city's denial of
notice of the threat).
6. E.g., Hagans v. Oliver Mach. Co., 576 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1978) (admitting
OSHA safety standards for products comparable to defendant's saw to show the

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol27/iss1/22

2

Moen:VERY
Discovery
RegulatoryTORY
Information
for Use in Private Products L
DISCO
OFofREGULA
INFORMATION
20001 Graham and

Before litigants can use this potentially valuable information,
however, they must first gain access to it. Unfortunately, even after
the passage of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) in the
United States,7 and the efforts of the European Union to provide
for access to government information, it nevertheless remains difficult for private citizens to access more than a limited amount of information from governmental agencies.
This article will discuss the major roadblocks to getting information in the form of documents or testimony from European or
United States regulators for use in private litigation. It will discuss
the apparent weakening of some of these roadblocks, such as the
"Housekeeping Privilege," which is used to block access to agency
information in the United States, 9 and the development of alternative roadblocks that continue to shield domestic information from
disclosure.' 0 This article will also discuss the barriers to pretrial discovery in U.S. courts of European regulatory information." Finally,
this article will provide some pointers on how litigants might obtain
certain types of domestic
and European agency information in cer2
tain circumstances.

II. ACCESS TO UNITED STATES REGULATORY INFORMATION
A.

The HousekeepingPrivilege

For hundreds of years, the federal government effectively resisted attempts to gain access to federal agency information by citing the "Housekeeping Privilege." The Housekeeping Privilege derives from
a13 statute enacted in 1789 during George Washington's
S
presidency. The statute, sometimes known as the Housekeeping
Statute, enabled President Washington to "get his administration
underway" by authorizing executive agency officials to set up their
saw always exceed industry safety practices and national safety standards).
7. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1967). The FOIA is a part of the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA), (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq. (1946)).
8. Infra notes 23-124 and accompanying text.
9. Infra notes 23-54 and accompanying text.
10. Infra notes 55-109 and accompanying text.
11. Infra notes 12-126 and accompanying text.
12. Infranotes 110-121 and 127-108 and accompanying text.
13. 3 U.S.C. § 301 (1948). As originally enacted, the statute provided that
"[t]he head of an Executive department or military department may prescribe
regulations for the government of his department, the conduct of its employees,
the distribution and performance of its business, and the custody, use, and preser-

vation of its records, papers, and property." Id.
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offices, regulate their employees, conduct business, and maintain
agency records and property.14 Whether or not Congress intended
it at the time, however, federal agencies have found this enabling
statute particularly useful in resisting disclosure of agency information to the public. Indeed, even the passage of the Freedom of Information Act 5 in 1967 barely affected the Housekeeping Statute's
usefulness in this regard.
B.

The Touhy Doctrine

The Supreme Court bolstered the Housekeeping Statute's protection of agency information in 1953 when it decided United States
ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen.16 In Touhy, the Supreme Court reversed a contempt order that a federal district court had entered against an FBI
agent who had defied a subpoena duces tecum.f The agent refused
to supply the requested documents citing FBI regulations prohibiting their disclosure. 8 The Court held that a federal agent who acts
in accordance with the agency's valid, statutorily authorized regulations cannot be held in contempt for those actions. 19
The court expressly declined to address the constitutionality of
the regulations themselves. 20 Nevertheless, the "Touhy doctrine," as
it came to be known, 2 ' became the prime authority for agencies to
continue to resist disclosure of agency information. In fact, following the Touhy decision, many federal agencies' housekeeping regulations began to make express reference to the case. 22
Legal scholars soundly criticized the government's use of both
the Housekeeping Statute and the Touhy decision to withhold in14. H.R. Rep. No. 1461, at 1 (1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3352,
3352. See also, Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 309-12 (1979) (generally discussing the history of the Housekeeping Statute, and concluding that regulations
promulgated pursuant to the statute are mere "rules of agency organization, pro-

cedure, or practice' as opposed to 'substantive rules"').
15.
16.
17.

5 U.S.C. § 552 (1967).
340 U.S. 462 (1951).
Id. at 467-68.

18.

Id. at 465.

19. Id. at 467-68.
20. Id. at 467.
21.
Robert R. Kiesel, Note, Every Man's Evidence and Ivory Tower Agencies: How
May a Civil Litigant Obtain Testimony from an Employee of a Nonparty Federal Agency ?,,
59 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1647, 1652 (1991).
22. John T. Richmond, Jr., Note, Forty-five Years Since United States ex rel.
Touhy v. Ragen: The Time Is Ripefor a Change to a More FunctionalApproach, 40 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 173, 183 & n.69 (1996) (noting that at least 38 agencies have nondisclosure regulations that refer specifically to the Touhy decision).
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formation,23 but the courts have paid little heed and have generally
sided with the government.24 Even after Congress amended the
Housekeeping Statute in 1958 to include the sentence: "This section does not authorize withholding information from the public
or limiting the availability of records to the public, '2 5 the effect of
the statute, combined with the Touhy decision, remained virtually
the same,2 6 until recently.
C.

The Weakening Of The Touhy Doctrine

Within the last decade, federal courts have begun to seriously
question the scope of Touhy and the Housekeeping Statute. The
first federal appellate court to take a firm stand against Touhy, and
in favor of federal agency disclosure, was the Ninth Circuit in 1994.
That year, in Exxon Shipping Co. v. United States Department of the Inte7
7ior,
the Ninth Circuit determined that federal agencies had no
authority to prohibit their employees from disclosing
information
28
in response to a lawful federal court subpoena.
The Exxon Shipping Co. case arose out of the devastating Alaskan oil spill disaster in 1989. 29 Plaintiffs who lost property and livelihood as a result of the spill brought state and federal court actions
to recover damages from Exxon Shipping Co. 30 In defending the
litigation, Exxon sought discovery from ten federal agents representing five separate federal government agencies that had investigated the oil spill.3
Exxon issued deposition subpoenas to the federal agents. 2
23. Exxon Shipping Co. v. United States, 34 F.3d 774, 778 n.6 (9th Cir.
1994).
24. Jason C. Grech, Note, Exxon Shipping, the Power to Subpoena FederalAgency
Employees, and the Housekeeping Statute: Cleaning Up the Housekeeping Privilegefor the
Chimney-Sweeper's Benefit, 37 WM. & MARYL. REv. 1137, 1144 & n.39 (1996).
25. 3 U.S.C. § 301 (1958).
26. Grech, supra note 24, at 1144 & n.39; see also Richmond, supranote 22, at
182-83 & nn.64-70.
27. 34 F.3d 774 (9th Cir. 1994).
28. Id. at 778 (" [N] either the statute's text, its legislative history, nor Supreme
Court case law supports the government's argument that [3 U.S.C.] § 301 authorizes agency heads to withhold documents or testimony from federal courts."); see
also id. at 778 n.6 (citing the works of commentators who have reached the same
conclusion).
29. Id. at 775.
30.
SeaHawk Seafoods, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., No. A89-0095-CV (D. Ala.);
Exxon Valdez Litig., No. 3AN-89-2533CI (Ala. Sup. Ct.).
31.
Exxon Shipping Co., 34 F.3d at 775-76.
32. Id. at 775.
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None of the subpoenaed agents, however, complied with the subpoena.3 Eight of the ten agents failed to appear for their depositions, on orders from their agency employers. Two of the subpoenaed agents appeared and gave limited testimony, but were
instructed not to answer many of the questions. 35 None of the
agencies or subpoenaed parties had brought a motion to quash the
subpoenas. 6
Exxon, thereafter, filed a complaint in federal district court alleging violations of the Housekeeping Statute and the Administrative Procedure Act.3 7 The government resisted, citing the Touhy
Doctrine and claiming the federal agents' actions were proper and
authorized by the Housekeeping Statute.
39
The Ninth Circuit disagreed. The court determined that the
federal Housekeeping Statute does not, by its own force, authorize
federal agency heads to withhold evidence sought under a valid
federal court subpoena. 40 The court looked to the legislative history, and found that the 1958 amendment was dispositive. 4 1 The
amendment, the court found, was made specifically in response to
the perceived evolution of the Housekeeping Statute from a tool
for federal agencies to maintain internal order to a claim of author41
ity to keep information from the public.
In addition, the court rejected the government's assertion that
agency heads' discretion to allow their employees to testify was a
fundamental issue of the federal government's sovereign immunity.4 3 The court saw this argument as antithetical to the concept of
separation of powers, 4" quoting United States v. Reynolds, 45 "J] udicial
control over the evidence in
a case cannot be abdicated to the ca46
price of executive officers.,

33.

Id. at 776.

34.

Id.

35.
36.

Id.
Id.

37.

Specifically, Exxon alleged the government's actions were in violation of 5

U.S.C. § 706(2) (A). Id at 776.

38.

Id. at 776.

39.

Id. at 778.

40.
41.
42.

Id.
Id. at 777-78.
Id.

43.

Id. at 778.

44.

Id.

45.

345 U.S. 1 (1953).

46.

Id. at 9-10.
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Finally, the court addressed the government's concerns regarding both the conservation of its agencies' employee resources and
the minimization of governmental involvement in controversial
private litigation. 4' The court felt both these concerns could be ad48
dressed under the general rules of discovery. Under the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Exxon Shipping Co., therefore, federal agencies
are held to the same standards as any other non-party served with a
valid subpoena in federal court. 9 The agency is compelled to resubject only to the limitations set forth in
spond to the subpoena,
5
Rules 26 and 45.
D. Another Roadblock: FederalSovereign Immunity
As recently as 1999, however, the Fourth Circuit, in COMSAT v.
National Science Foundation,5' declined to follow the Ninth Circuit's
lead in Exxon Shipping Co. 52 Instead, it upheld the NSF's refusal to

comply with a subpoena issued by an arbitrator under the Federal
Arbitration Act. 53 The court did not, however, directly take issue
with the Ninth Circuit's decision regarding Touhy. Rather, the
Fourth Circuit relied on a 54somewhat different analysis based on
federal sovereign immunity.

47. Exxon Shipping Co., 34 F.3d at 779.
48. Id. at 779.
We acknowledge the government's serious and legitimate concern that its
employee resources not be commandeered into service by private litigants to the detriment of the smooth functioning of government operations. However, we are confident that district courts can, and will, balance the government's concerns under the general rules of discovery.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly provide for limitations on
discovery in cases such as this.
Id.
49. See also Houston Bus. J., Inc. v. Comptroller of the Currency, 86 F.3d 1208
(D.C. Cir. 1996). "[N]either the Federal Housekeeping Statute nor the Touhy decision authorizes a federal agency to withhold documents from a federal court."
Id. at 1212 (citing Exxon Shipping Co., 34 F.3d at 777-78) (dictum).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) ("[T]he court...may make any order which
50. See, e.g.,
justice requires to protect a party... from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression,
or undue burden or expense..."); Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(3) ("[T]he court...shall
quash or modify the subpoena if it.. .subjects a person to undue burden.).
51. 190 F.3d 269 (4th Cir. 1999).
52. Id. at 277.
53. 9 U.S.C. § 7 (1999) ("[A]rbitrators ... may summon in writing any person
to attend before them or any of them as a witness and in a proper case to bring
with him or them any book record, document, or paper, which may be deemed
material...").
54. COMSAT, 190 F.3d at 277 ("[Ilt is sovereign immunity, not housekeeping
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The principle of federal sovereign immunity, which holds that
no action may be made against the United States government without its consent, is firmly entrenched in our country's jurisprudence. 5 The authority for the principle, however, remains unclear.56 It is generally considered to have derived from the English
common law rule that "the King can do no wrong. In any case,
the prevailing rule is clear that Congress alone may consent to suits
brought againstS.58
the United States, and such Congressional consent
must be explicit.

Sovereign immunity applies to suits against federal officers as
well as to suits against the United States whenever the relief sought
would "operate against the latter."' 59 The Supreme Court has further declared that
[a]ctions of an officer [that] do not conflict with the
terms of his valid statutory authority...are the actions of
the sovereign, whether or not they are tortious under
general law, if [those actions] would be regarded as the
actions 6Oof a private principal under the normal rules of
agency.
Thus, a federal agent who acts in accordance with the agency's
valid, statutorily authorized regulations6' is deemed to act on behalf
regulations, that gives rise to the government's power to refuse compliance with a
subpoena."). As will be seen, the Fourth Circuit's sovereign immunity analysis
bears a striking resemblance to the Touhy analysis. See infra text accompanying
note 69.
55.
ERWIN CHEMERNSKY, FEDERALJURISDIcrION § 9.2.1, at 589 (3d ed. 1999).
56. Id. at 590 (citing United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 207) (1882) ("The
principle has never been discussed or the reasons for it given, but it has always
been treated as an established doctrine.").
57. Id. Chemerinsky notes that commentators have often criticized the doctrine of federal sovereign immunity, believing it to be an "anachronistic relic,"
finding that it places the federal government "above the law," and observing that it
appears to be nothing more than a "common law principle borrowed from the English common law."-No mention of the principle exists anywhere within the US
Constitution. Id. at 591-92. Chemerinsky notes that even President Lincoln disapproved of the doctrine, declaring it to be "as much the duty of government to render prompt justice against itself in favor of citizens as it is to administer the same
between private individuals." Id. at 591 (citing 7JAMES D. RicHARDSON, A COMPILATION OF MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 3245, 3252, quoted in Kennecott
Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 327 U.S. 573, 580 (1946) (Frankfurter, J.,dissenting)).
58. Id. at 590.
59. Haw v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57,58 (1963).
60. Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 695
(1979), quoted in CHEMERINSKI, supra note 63, § 9.2.2, at 594.
61. Here is where the Fourth Circuit's sovereign immunity analysis and the
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of the United States government. In some circuits it has been recognized, however, that the principle of sovereign immunity does
not apply to federal court subpoenas directed to the federal gov62
ernment.
3
In 1989, the Fourth Circuit held in Boron Oil Co. v. Downie
that enforcement of a subpoena of a federal agent is subject to the
government's sovereign immunity. More recently, in United States
v. Williams, the Fourth Circuit held that although Congress waived
sovereign
immunity
the Administrative Procedure Act
66
.
.in enacting
67
.
(APA), the waiver is limited. Thus, according to the Fourth Circuit, if the agency reaches a final decision not to comply with a
subpoena, the court's review is limited to determining whether the
agency's decision is in accordance with the agency's own housekeeping procedures and whether the agency's decision is arbitrary
or capricious. 68
In COMSAT, the Fourth Circuit was highly critical of the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Exxon Shipping Co., finding that the Ninth Circuit's decision "abrogates the doctrine of sovereign immunity to a
significant degree. 6 According to the Fourth Circuit, the Exxon
court wrongly overlooked "an important limitation" on the APA's
waiver of sovereign immunity, stating that "courts may reverse an
agency's decision not to comply7 0 [with a subpoena] only when the
agency has acted unreasonably."

seemingly now pass6 Touhy doctrine begin to look remarkably similar. See supra
text accompanying note 17.
62. Northrup Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 751 F.2d 395, 399 n.2
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (noting both the court's and the parties' inability to find any case
in which the issue of federal sovereign immunity in connection with federal court
subpoena process had even been explicitly discussed; asserting that "[s]ince at
least 1965, however, this court has assumed the nonapplicability of sovereign immunity to such a subpoena."). But see Houston Bus. J. v. Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency, 86 F.3d 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (stating, albeit in dicta, that federal
court litigants can obtain federal agency discovery by means of a subpoena because "the federal government has waived its sovereign immunity," (emphasis
added) (citing APA )).
63. 873 F.2d 67 (4th Cir. 1989).
64. Id. at 69.
65. 170 F.3d 431 (4th Cir. 1999).
66. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1946).
67. Williams, 170 F.3d at 434.
68. COMSATv. Nat'l. Sci Found., 190 F.3d 269, 277-78 (4th Cir. 1999). The
Second Circuit has also rejected the Ninth Circuit's approach in the Fourth Circuit's holding in COMSAT EPA v. Gen. Elec. Co., 197 F.3d 592 (2d Cir. 1999).
69. COMSAT, 190 F.3d at 277.
70. Id. (citation omitted).
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The COMSAT court, however, misread the Exxon decision and
failed to consider the full scope of judicial review provided by the
APA. 71 In Exxon, the Ninth Circuit took a step back from Touhy to
determine whether the agency's housekeeping regulation itself was
valid and determined that it was not. This review of the validity of
the agency's regulation was well within the court's authority under
the APA, which provides that a reviewing court "shall... set aside
agency action.. .found to be.. .in excess of statutor jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right." Once the Ninth
Circuit made the determination that the regulation was invalid, it
had no further need to assess the reasonableness of the agency in
acting upon that regulation. The Ninth Circuit's ruling did not abrogate sovereign immunity because the court's review was well
within the Congressional waiver of sovereign immunity set forth in
the APA.73
E. The Special Problem ForState Court Litigants
State court litigants are even more limited in their options for
obtaining federal agency information than are federal court litigants. The principle of sovereign immunity takes on a different
significance in state court where it is generally assumed there is no
71. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (West 1996). The full text of this section is as follows:
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing
court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional
and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of
the terms of an agency action. The reviewing court shall-compel agency
action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and hold unlawful
and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to bearbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or
short of statutory right; without observance of procedure required by law;
unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556 and
557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing
provided by statute; or unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the
facts are subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court. In making the
foregoing determinations, the court shall review the whole record or
those parts of it cited by a party, and due account shall be taken of the
rule of prejudicial error.
Id.

72.

5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (C) (West 1996).

73. See also Gregory S. Coleman, Note, Touhy and the Housekeeping Privilege:
Dead but not Buried?, 70 TEX. L. REv. 685, 701 (1992). "[T]he sovereign immunity
analysis presupposes that the official has acted within the scope of his delegated
authority." Id.
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jurisdiction over the United States government. Accordingly, a
subpoena issued by a state court to a federal agency is unenforceable.75
State court litigants have attempted to gain federal subpoena
authority with no success. In Houston Business Journal,Inc. v. United

States,76 for example, a Texas newspaper attempted to obtain records from the United States Comptroller using this method, having failed in two earlier attempts using. more conventional procedures. The newspaper, defending against a libel suit in Texas state
court, sought to obtain what it expected would be exculpatory' materials from the United States Comptroller of the Currency. The
newspaper served a subpoena duces tecum, issued by the Texas state
court, on the Comptroller's office in Houston." The Comptroller
responded by referring the newspaper to its administrative information 79request procedure promulgated under the Housekeeping
Statute.

After an exchange of correspondence, the Comptroller eventually released some but not all of the documents the newspaper
requested. s° It provided the documents along with a letter decision
which stated that all the requested documents were protected by an
executive privilege. It further stated that the letter decision constituted "final agency action" for purposes of the APA.8' The newspaper, dissatisfied with the limited production, obtained an order
from the Texas state court compelling the Comptroller to comply
with its subpoena duces tecum."s
At this stage, the Comptroller removed the matter to federal

74. Houston Bus. J. v. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 86 F.3d
1208, 1211 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("In state court the federal government is shielded by
sovereign immunity, which prevents the state court from enforcing a subpoena.");
see also Edwards v. United States Dep't of Justice, 43 F.3d 312 (7th Cir. 1994);
Sharon Lease Oil Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 691 F. Supp. 381
(D.D.C. 1988); Envtl. Enter., Inc. v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, 664 F. Supp.
585 (D.D.C. 1987). Some courts have attributed the US government's immunity
from suit in state court to the Constitution's Supremacy Clause. E.g., Bosaw v.
Nat'l Treasury Employees' Union, 887 F. Supp. 1199, 1217 (S.D. Ind. 1995).
75. Infra note 83 and cases cited therein.
76. 86 F.3d 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
77. Id. at 1210.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1210-11.
82. Id. at 1211.
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court83 and moved to quash the state-court subpoena. 84 The news-

paper added claims in the federal court action under the Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA) and the APA.s5 The court granted the
86
motion to quash, denied the FOIA claim citing the newspaper's
failure to file an FOIA request, and denied the APA claim on
the Comptroller's
decision was "not arbitrary and cagrounds .that
.
.87
pricious or contrary to law.J The newspaper appealed to the Fifth
Circuit, which affirmed. 8
The newspaper, however, was not yet ready to give up. It proceeded to bring an action in the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia for purposes of obtaining a federal court
subpoena. s9 The Comptroller, however, disregarded the federal
court subpoena, and the newspaper moved the federal district
court for an order to compel production. The court denied the
motion on grounds of issue preclusion. 91 On appeal to the D.C.
Circuit, the court affirmed, not on collateral estoppel or issue preclusion grounds, but rather, on grounds that the district court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction.

83. Federal agents have the right to remove to federal court any state court
civil or criminal action against them. 28 U.S.C. § 1442 (West 1994). Moreover,
their right of removal is "absolute for conduct performed under color of federal
office." Arizona v. Manypenny, 451 U.S. 232, 242 (1981). This right extends to
contempt proceedings arising from discovery disputes between a party to a state
court action and a nonparty federal officer. Bosaw v. Nat'l Treasury Employees'
Union, 887 F. Supp. 1199, 1206 (S.D. Ind. 1995) (citing Edwards v. United States,
43 F.3d 312 (7th Cir. 1994); Louisiana v. Sparks, 978 F.2d 226 (5th Cir. 1992); Florida v. Cohen, 887 F.2d 1451 (l1th Cir. 1989); Boron Oil Co. v. Downie, 873 F.2d
67 (4th Cir. 1989); Nationwide Investors v. Miller, 793 F.2d 1044 (9th Cir. 1986);
Swett v. Schenk, 792 F.2d 1447 (9th Cir. 1986); Wisconsin v. Hamdia, 765 F.2d 612
(7th Cir. 1985); Carr v. North Carolina, 386 F.2d 129 (4th Cir. 1967); Ferrell v.
Yarberry, 848 F. Supp. 121 (E.D. Ark. 1994); California v. Reyes, 816 F. Supp. 619
(E.D. Cal. 1992); Reynolds Metals v. Crowther, 572 F. Supp. 288 (D. Mass. 1982)).
84. Houston Bus.J,86 F.3d at 1211.
85. Id.
86. The opinion does not state the grounds on which the court granted the
Comptroller's motion to quash. Id. Presumably, it was on grounds of derivative
jurisdiction. Bosaw, 887 F. Supp. at 1209 ("When an action against federal officers
is removed pursuant to § 1442, the federal district court acquires no independent
jurisdiction on removal. Rather, its jurisdiction is derivative of that of the state
court.").
87. Houston Bus. J, 86 F.3d at 1211.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.

91.

Id.

92.

Id.
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The D.C. Circuit framed the issue as follows: "[W] hen the underlying litigation is in state court, can a litigant eager to avoid the
limitations on the state court's subpoena power obtain 9a4 federal9'
court subpoena instead?" The court held in the negative.
Citing to Article III of the Constitution, the court observed
that the federal courts' subpoena power is limited to cases in which
the federal court has subject-matter jurisdiction over the underlying action.95 The court determined that the D.C. District Court had
no jurisdiction over the underlying state court libel claims, and
therefore, had no jurisdiction to issue the subpoena upon the
Comptroller. 96 Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's
denial of the newspaper's motion to compel. 7 Presumably, the
newspaper never obtained the exculpatory information it sought.
F

ProcedureFor ObtainingFederalAgency Information
1. File A Request ForInformation Under The Freedom Of
Information Act

Each federal agency has promulgated its own rules regarding
access of information under the FOIA. In addition, many agencies
have published on the Internet procedures for accessing information. Provided here are the procedures for accessing information
from the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC).
The CPSC's "housekeeping" regulations, governing access to
information for use in private litigation, are codified at 16 C.F.R.
Part 1016 (1999). The Commission's stated policy in this regard is
"to make official records available to private litigants, to the fullest
extent possible ' 9s while conserving "the time of its employees for
work on Commission projects and activities. ''9
As for CPSC records in private litigation, the CPSC requires
that parties request the information in accordance with its general
FOIA procedures.1° These procedures require that requests be
93. Id.at 1212.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1213. The court noted that the federal court's subpoena power may
also extend to certain circumstances in which an action is cognizable in federal
court or in cases in which the subpoenaed information is necessary for the court
to ascertain its own jurisdiction. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1214.
98. 16 C.F.R. § 1016.1 (a) (1999).
99. Id. § 1016.1(b).
100. 16 C.F.R. Part 1015 (1999) (codifying CPSC's procedures for FOIA re-
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made in writing, reasonably describing the records sought."' The
CPSC "shall respond to all written requests within twenty (20) working days (excepting Saturdays, Sundays, and legal public holidays)." 2 The twenty days begin as of the date CPSC receives and
date-stamps the request.
The CPSC has reserved for itself the right to withhold from
production certain categories of records it terms "exempt.' ' 0 4 These
include such things as: documents classified by Executive Order as
"secret;" 1 5 the Commission's internal personnel rules and procedures; °6 trade secrets and confidential commercial information the
Commission has obtained from other sources; '°7 personnel and
medical files, "the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;"'10 8 and certain records
and information compiled for law enforcement purposes, particularly where disclosure of such information could interfere with the
investigation or the investigated party's civil rights.'0 9
Parties dissatisfied with the CPSC's response to their requests
for information may appeal the denial to the CPSC's General
Counsel.' The appeal must be made within thirty days of the requester's receipt of the CPSC's denial of information. The General Counsel will respond to the appeal within twenty days of the
date the CPSC receives the appeal. The General Counsel's decision constitutes final agency action, of which the requesting party
quests).
101. 16 C.F.R. § 1015.3(a), (b) (1999).
102. Id. § 1015.5(a). The CPSC's time for responding may be extended by 10
working days under specified "unusual circumstances." Id. § 1015.5(b).
103. Id.
104. Id. § 1015.15.
105. Id. § 1015.16(a).
106. Id. § 1015.16(b).
107. Id. § 1015.16(d). Persons submitting such information to the CPSC may
request that the information be treated as confidential. Id. § 1015.18. As set more
fully in the text accompanying notes 118-121, infra, parties requesting information
have procedures available to challenge the agency's withholding of materials
deemed exempt. Accordingly, the CPSC requires that those who submit confidential information agree "to assist the Commission in the defense of any judicial proceeding that might thereafter be brought to compel the disclosure of information
which the Commission has determined to be a trade secret or privileged or confidential commercial or financial information." Id. § 1015.18(e).
108. Id. § 1015.16(f).
109. Id. § 1015.16(g).
110. Id. § 1015.7(a).
111. Id.
112. Id. § 1015.7(b).
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may seek judicial review according to the APA.113
The procedure for obtaining testimony of CPSC employees in
private litigation is less straightforward. Requests for agency employee testimony must be made directly to the Commission's General Counsel. 114 The General Counsel's decision to grant or deny
permission is reviewable by the Commission at its discretion. The
General Counsel may, at the General Counsel's discretion, authorize the testimony of a CPSC employee in private litigation in which
the General Counsel believes such testimony would be in the best
interests of the CPSC. 116
2. Obtain A FederalCourt Subpoena If The Action Is PendingIn
Federal Court

Litigants in federal court may attempt to obtain CPSC information by subpoena. The CPSC has anticipated this likelihood, and
its housekeeping regulations have provided a procedure for responding to subpoenas. Generally speaking, all subpoenas served
upon the CPSC are to be handled directly by the General Counsel. The CPSC will respond to a subpoena duces tecum that does
not seek testimony as if it were any other FOIA request. 118 Likewise,
a subpoena for testimony is treated as any other request for agency
testimony as provided above. CPSC employees served with a subpoena are instructed to immediately notify the Office of the General Counsel.11 9 The General Counsel is directed to take steps, in
conjunction with the Department of Justice, to quash such subpoenas or seek protective 2 0orders if necessary to prevent improper disclosure of documents.

In short, the CPSC's response to a subpoena will be the same
as its response to any written request for documents or testimony.
From a federal court litigant's perspective, however, it may be ad113. Id. § 1015.7(e); see also 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (4) (B) (1999).
114. 16 C.F.R. § 1016.4(a) (1999) ("No Commission employee shall testify in
his or her official capacity in any private litigation, without express authorization
from the Commission's General Counsel.").
115. Id. Presumably, if the Commission denies review of the General Counsel's
decision to refuse permission to testify, the General Counsel's decision is deemed
final agency action subject to judicial review according to the APA.
116. Id. § 1016.4(b).
117. Id. §§ 1016.3(c); 1016.4.
118. Id. § 1016.3(a).
119. Id. § 1016.4(b).
120. Id. § 1016.3(c); see also id. at § 1016.4(b) (stating the Commission's response to subpoenas for testimony from Commission employees).
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vantageous to make both a standard FOIA written request for information and serve a subpoena for the same information.12 1 In this
way, the litigant has two avenues of recourse available if all the requested information is not provided: (1) judicial review of the
agency's final decision according to the APA; and (2) subpoena enforcement procedures.
III. ACCESS TO EUROPEAN REGULATORY INFORMATION
While there is at least limited precedent for obtaining testimony from United States regulators, a party's ability to obtain testimony from European or European Union regulators is severely
limited by the nature of litigation in civil law countries and their
view of pretrial discovery. Most if not all European countries look
unfavorably upon American style discovery and avoid exhaustive
pretrial discovery, especially of non-parties."' In civil law countries,
such as France and Germany, discovery is controlled by the judge
and often is conducted during the course of trial.
European discovery practices, the general litigation environment, and certain countries' product liability laws make it difficult for litigants in U.S. courts to obtain European regulatory records. Obtaining the testimony of a European Union or Member
State regulator in an American court, much less foreign state
courts, is unprecedented. There are no decisions from American or
European courts that address whether courts can force foreign
regulators to testify when the testimony could be relevant to issues
in a product liability case or any other type of private tort litigation.
The EU has adopted a directive on access to documents,
known as the "Transparency Doctrine. ,,124 This directive, like the
121. To prevent undue delay and duplication of effort, litigants should deliver
their written requests pursuant to the FOIA together with the court's subpoena.
122. Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Ct. for
the Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 561 n.18 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("In
England, for example, though document discovery is available, depositions do not
exist, interrogatories have a strictly limited use, and discovery as to third parties is
generally not allowed." (quoting S. SEIDEL, EXTRATERRITORIAL DIScOvERY IN INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION 24 (1984))).
123. In France, which applies strict liability in products litigation, it is not a defense that a device meets certain regulatory standards. C.civ. art. 1386-10 (Fr.)
("The manufacturer can be held responsible for the defect even if the product was
manufactured according to the rules of the art or to existing standards, or was the
object of an administrative authorization.").Id. Therefore, a civil law judge would
have no reason to interrogate a regulator about such compliance.
124. Council Decision 93/731 EC on Public Access to Council Documents,
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FOJA in the United States, allows citizens of European Union
countries to request documents of the Commission or its constituent institutions. Obtaining documents in this indirect fashion may
be more informative than attempting to challenge the sovereignty
of Member States or EU institutions by seeking to directly interrogate regulators or other government officials, even if the admissibility of such documents and the information they contain may be
more challenging.
A.

Methods ForAttempting To Gather Testimony From Regulators In
Europe

Obtaining discovery in European countries under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure relies almost entirely on the voluntary cooperation of the witness or the discretionary authority of foreign
courts and governments through vehicles such as Letters of Request under Rule 28(b) or the Hague Convention. 125 Particularly in
civil law countries, there is an unwillingness by judges to participate
in broad pre-trial discovery of non-parties and they are not likely to
allow broad inquiries from foreign courts. 126 However, the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure do provide certain methods by which litigants can attempt to discover non-parties in foreign countries.
1.

Deposition By Written Stipulation

Before attempting to compel the deposition of a non-party
foreign regulator, a party may try to secure the testimony by
agreement. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 29 states:
[u]nless otherwise directed by the Court, the parties may
by written stipulation (1) provide that depositions may be
taken before any person, at any time or place, upon any
notice, and in any manner and when so taken may be
used like other depositions, and (2) modify other proce-

1993 O.J. (L 340) 43; Council Decision 94/90 ECSC, EC, Euratom on Public Access to Documents, 1994 O.J. (L 46) 58.

125.

E.g., First Am. Corp. v. Price Waterhouse, LLP, 154 F.3d 16 (2d Cir. 1998)

(non-parties are subject to the same scope of discovery under the federal rules as a
party); Capital Triple Crown Am., Inc. v. Biosynth A.G., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 617
(E.D. Pa. Apr. 29, 1998) (proceeding in a manner consistent with the Hague Convention for non-party discovery by Aperson in Switzerland).
126. Richard L. Marcus, Retooling American Discovery for the Twenty First Century;
Toward a New World Order?, 7 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 153, 193-94 (1999).
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dures governing or limitations placed upon discovery.... 127
Obviously, stipulated procedures are only effective when the
witness is cooperative and the terms of the agreement do not vio2
late the law of the country where the deposition will take place. 8
This means that the stipulation cannot usurp the function of the
foreign judiciary or infringe upon the host country's sovereignty.
It would be unlikely, however, that a foreign regulator would
voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of a court in the United
States. It would be even more unlikely that all parties would agree
that such discovery would be beneficial. This is not to say that such
regulators would be unwilling to discuss decisions related to the
approval or investigation of the products involved in litigation in an
informal setting, but there is no good reason to voluntarily submit
to a procedure from which they are protected pursuant to the applicable foreign state law.
2.

Letters Of Request And The Hague Convention

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 28(b) covers the taking of
depositions in foreign countries. It provides that in cases where a
witness will not voluntarily appear, "depositions may be taken in a
foreign country (1) pursuant to any applicable treaty or convention, or (2) pursuant to a Letter of Request .. ,,129 Recognizing
that foreign proceedings do not always follow the American pattern, Rule 28(b) specifically states:
[e]vidence obtained in response to a Letter of Request
need not be excluded merely because it is not a verbatim
transcript, because the testimony was not taken under
oath, or because any similar departure from the requirements for depositions
taken within the United States un13 0
der these rules.

The standard for obtaining a Letter of Request under Rule
28(b) is relatively low. The rule provides that the court "shall" issue
a Letter of Request "upon application and notice and on terms that
are just and appropriate.
Moreover, the moving party is not required to show that "taking of the deposition in any other matter is
127.

FED. R. Crv. P. 29.
128. 6JAMESWM. MooRE, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACrIcE § 285, at 28-27 (Danial R.
Coqvillette, et al. eds., 3d ed. 1979).
129. FED. R. CIv. P. 28 (b).
130. Id.
131. Id.
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impracticable or inconvenient" in order to obtain a Letter of Re132
quest.
Where federal courts lack the power to obtain evidence from a
non-party located abroad, it is clear from the advisory committee's
133
notes that the court may resort to a Letter of Request. The advisory committee notes state that, with respect to Rule 4 5(e), "the
second paragraph continues the present procedure applicable to
certain witnesses who are in foreign countries. 134 Ultimately, unless
the uncooperative witness in a European country is a United States
national or resident, litigants should be required to apply to the
court to issue a Letter
of Request to compel the production of evi1 35

dence by that witness.
The Supreme Court,
16.in Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale
137
v. United States,136 stated that the Hague Evidence Convention
is

not the only means by which to pursue discovery in a foreign jurisdiction."' Nevertheless, in seeking the testimony of foreign government officials, the special issues of comity probably require that
Hague Convention procedures be used. Some courts consider
three major factors to determine whether parties must utilize the
Hague Convention to obtain discovery: (1) the particular facts of
the case; (2) the sovereign interests involved; and (3) the likelihood that resort to the Hague Convention would be an effective

132. Id.
133. FED. R. Civ. P. 28(b) advisory committee's note (1937). Courts have
shown a reluctance to exercise the full range of subpoena powers over foreign
non-party witnesses found within their territorial jurisdiction. Laker Airways v. Pan
Am. World Airways, 607 F. Supp. 324 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Robert C. O'Brien, Compelling the Productionof Evidence by Non-parties in England Under the Hague Convention, 24
SYRACUSEJ. INT'L. L & COM.. 77, 86-87 (1997).
134. FED. R. Civ. P. 45, advisory committee's note.

135. The United States Code, at 28 U.S.C. section 1783, provides for an important exception to the territorial limits placed on a court's authority to enforce a
subpoena under Rule 45 where United States nationals or residents are involved.
In civil litigation, courts may issue a subpoena requiring "a national or resident of
the United States who is in a foreign country" to appear to give testimony or to
produce a specified document or other thing, if the Court finds that the particular
testimony or the production of the document or other thing by him is necessary in
the interest of justice, and it is not possible to obtain his testimony in admissible
form without his personal appearance to obtain the production of the document
or other thing in any other manner. 28 U.S.C. § 1783 (West 1994).
136. 482 U.S. 522 (1987).

137.

The Hague Convention of 18 March 1970 on the Taking of the Evidence

Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, reprinted in 28
U.S.C.A. following §1781 [hereinafter Hague Convention].
138. Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 533.
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discovery device. '3 9
The Aerospatialecourt did not provide any specific guidance to
the lower courts for making the comity analysis.14 Ultimately, the
AerospatialeSupreme Court held that the Hague Convention clearly
applies to evidence in the possession of non-U.S. litigants. The
Court stated that "[t] he degree of friction created by discovery requests... and the differing perceptions of the acceptability of
American-style discovery under national and international law, suggests some efforts to moderate the application abroad of US procedural techniques, consistent with the overall principle of reasonableness and the exercise of jurisdiction. ''141 Clearly, use of the
Hague Convention would be the most potentially effective means
to compel the testimony of foreign regulators.
A complete discussion of the Hague Convention is not warranted in this article, but a brief description of Convention procedures may be helpful for those who wish to proceed according to its
requirements in an attempt to secure testimony from foreign regulators located in countries which are signatories.
3.

ProceedingPursuantTo The Hague Convention

There are two primary procedures set out in the Hague Convention in an effort to bridge the gap between common law and
civil law methods of international assistance. The first is the Letter
of Request procedure which is the method of international judicial
assistance most commonly utilized by civil law systems. The second
is the taking of evidence by diplomatic officers or commissioners.
This procedure is roughly analogous to the common law practice of
taking evidence abroad by notice, stipulation or through court appointed commissioners.
a.

Letters Of Request

Letters of Request consist of written requests for evidence
(generally document requests or requests to interrogate witnesses)
139. E.g., Perrier Bottled Water Litig., 138 F.R.D. 348, 354 (D. Conn. 1991);
Doster v. Schank, 141 F.R.D. 50, 51-52 (M.D.N.C. 1991); Haynes v. Kleinwafers,
119 F.R.D. 335, 337-339 (E.D.N.Y. 1988); Benton Graphics v. Uddeholm Corp.,
118 F.R.D. 386, 388 (D.N.J. 1987).
140. Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 546. ("[W]e do not articulate specific rules to
guide this delicate task of adjudication."). Id.

141.

Id. at 556 n.29 (quoting

UNITED STATES

RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE

§ 437).
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from a United States judge to the foreign sovereign asking that evidence be provided under the Convention. They are generally
sought in the U.S. court on motion and notice under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 28(b). 2
The Letter of Request should include a description of the action, the identity of the person to be examined, a list of questions
to be put to the witness or a statement of the subject matter of the
examination, a specification of documents requested, and a request
for execution utilizing "special procedures." 4 After the Letter of
Request is issued by the U.S. court, it is sent (generally by the lawyer for the requesting party) to the central authority of the nation
in which execution is to take place.' 44
Convention signatories should honor Letters of Request submitted in conformance with the Convention's procedures, unless
the requests do not fall within the functions of the judiciary or the
addressed state considers that its sovereignty or security would be
prejudiced. Execution may not be refused either on the ground
that the executing state asserts exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action or on ground that it does not recognize
the right of action being pursued in the U.S. court.141
Here, if the request relates to testimony by government authorities, Letters of Request will run into a significant roadblock
because they may be perceived to challenge or infringe on the sovereignty of the receiving state. In addition, civil law systems generally consider evidence gathering to be a judicial function performed as an aspect of a state's sovereign power. The examination
of a witness is conducted by the judge and usually results in a written summary prepared by the examining judge rather than a verbatim transcript of the witness's testimony. Therefore, in essence, a
Letter of Request seeking testimony of a foreign regulator will be
asking a judge to examine a government official. This is unlikely to
occur, especially when that official is a non-party witness in foreign
litigation.
b.

Taking OfEvidence By Diplomatic Officers Or Commissions

Taking of evidence by diplomatic officers or commissioners,
142. See generally Note, Taking Evidence Outside the United States, 55 B.U. L. REv.
368, 369-73 (1975).
143. Hague Convention, art. 3.
144. Hague Convention, art. 2, note 1.
145. Hague Convention, art. 12.
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while familiar to the common law world, represents a significant
departure from civil law systems where evidence gathering for civil
litigation is a judicial function. Thus, this process is not a likely option for compelling the testimony of foreign regulator. The Hague
Convention gives contracting states the right at the time of ratification to exclude, in whole or in part, the taking of evidence by diplomatic officers or commissioners.
The taking of evidence by these methods is subject to supervision by the states where the evidence is to be taken, and the degree
of supervision depends on whether the evidence is to be taken
from a national of the requesting or executing state or from a third
state. In this way, the Hague Convention allows contracting states to
exercise a degree of supervision over procedures they may consider
alien and intrusive. Compulsion of witnesses is not available under
these methods of evidence gathering, unless the executing state has
made a declaration that it will make such compulsion available.
Thus, the taking of evidence by commissioners or councils46 will
likely be useful only where the witness will appear voluntarily.
c.

Other Roadblocks ForDiscovery Of Foreign Regulators

There are other significant roadblocks for compelling the testimony of foreign regulators. Generally, American courts have determined that foreign regulatory or judicial action is not discoverable. For example, in the area of drugs and medical devices, the
courts have stated that the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is
uniquely147qualified to determine product
safety in the regulatory
148
context. In Potter v. Lederle Labs, for example, the court acknowledged the FDA's "exclusive" regulatory authority over safety
regulation of drug design and testing.1 4 9 Therefore, courts faced
with evidence from foreign regulators may refuse to accept it because they believe determinations by foreign regulatory bodies em146. Radvan, The Hague Convention on Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters: Several Notes Concerning its Scope, Methods and Compulsion, 16 INTL.
LAw& POL. 1031, 1033-34 & nn.7-8 (1984).
147. Premo Pharma Labs. v. United States, 629 F.2d 795, 802 (2d Cir. 1980);
United States v. Articles of Drug... Hormonin, 498 F. Supp. 424, 431 (D.N.J.
1980). Courts defer to the FDA because of their perceived superior expertise. See
e.g., Ciba v. Weinberger, 412 U.S. 640 (1973); CEG Schering Corp v. FDA, 51
F.390, 399 (3d Cir. 1995); A.L. Pharama v. Shalala, 62 F.3d 1484, 1491 (D.C. Cir.

1995).
148.
149.

655 F. Supp. 745 (D. Utah 1987).
Id. at 748.
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ploying different procedures and standards are not relevant to any
issue in litigation pending in the United States courts.
A New York court determined that foreign standards are not
admissible in a product liability suit pending in the United States
because the standards did not relate to the central issue in dis150
pute.
In a dispute regarding tractors sold by the defendant in a
foreign country, the court held that evidence sought was "irrelevant, overly broad and burdensome" because that information had
nothing to do with the "central issue in the dispute," that is, regulatory and liability
standards regarding such safety devices in the
1 51
States.
United
The Act of State Doctrine may also prevent discovery of foreign regulatory and judicial decisions. The "Act of State Doctrine"
prohibits United States courts from inquiring into the validity of actions or policies of a foreign government acting within its own sovereignty. The Doctrine is based upon the premise that domestic
courts cannot reexamine or modify the decisions of a foreign country. 15 Arguably, consideration of evidence regarding regulation of a
product by foreign countries would lead to an analysis of the motivation154 and intent behind each of those countries' regulatory actions.
B.

ObtainingRegulatory Documents In Europe

If having failed to secure the testimony of a European regulator, a party still wishes to obtain information on European regulatory activity, the party should consider making a request under the
public access directives. The European Union has established a
specific Code of Conduct,155 and has now proposed specific regulations,156 for how citizens can request documents of the European
150.

Alba v. Ford Motor Co., 489 N.Y.S.2d 192 (App. Div. 1985).

151.

Id. at 196.

152. E.g., Banco Nationale to Cuba v. Sabatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
153. Octgen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918).
154. Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Butter Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92
(D.C. Cal. 1971) (applying the Act of State Doctrine to private anti-trust suit because adjudication of the action would require analysis of the validity of the foreign sovereign's conduct). Cf Dovey v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 893-94
(D.C. Cal. 1997) (suggesting that invocation of the Act of State Doctrine is not appropriate unless it is "apparent" that adjudication of the matter will bring the nation into the hostile confrontation with foreign state).
155. Code of Conduct Concerning Public Access to Council and Commission
Documents, 1993 O.J. (L 340) 12, 31 [hereinafter Code of Conduct].
156. Proposal for Regulation Regarding Public Access to Documents of the
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Commission and its constituent institutions. These directives and
regulations provide a vehicle by which American litigants, with the
assistance of a citizen of a Member State, can obtain some documents at the European Commission level. These documents might
even include some Member State regulatory documents that have
found their way into the hands of Commission institutions because
of the Commission's product safety reporting requirements.
1.

Background

The final act of the treaty on EU, signed at Maastricht on February 7, 1992, contains a declaration on the right to access to information, which states:
[t]he conference considers that transparency of the decision-making process strengthens the democratic nature of
the institutions and the public's confidence in the administration. The conference accordingly recommends that
the Commission submit to the counsel no later than 1993
a report on measures to improve the public
access to the
57
information available to the institutions.1
At the close of the European Council held in Birmingham on
October 16, 1992, the heads of state of the governments issued 5 a8
further declaration entitled "A Community Close to Its Citizens,"'
in which they stressed the necessity of making the Community
more open. That commitment was yet again reaffirmed by the
European Council at Edinburgh on December 12, 1992, and the
Commission was again invited to continue to work on improving
access to the information available to Community institutions.
On May 5, 1993, the Commission adopted Communication6
93/C 156/05 on public access to the institutions' documents.'
This Communication contained the results of the survey on public
access to documents in different Member States and concluded
that there was a case for developing further access to documents at
the Community level. Subsequently, on June 2, 1993 the Commission adopted Communication 93/C 166/04 on openness in the

European Parliament, the
200/0032 COD (Brussels).
157. Treaty on European
tion, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 101.
158. Bulletin EC 10-1992,
159. Bulletin EC 12-1992,
160. 1993 OJ. (C 156) 5.

Council and the Commission, January 26, 2000
Union-Declaration on the right of access to informap.9 .
p. 7 .
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Community. 6 ' In it, the Commission elaborated the basic principles governing access to documents.
On December 6, 1993, within the framework of these preliminary steps toward implementing the principle of transparency, the
Council and the Commission approved a Code of Conduct concerning public access to Council and Commission documents aimed at
establishing principles to govern access to Council and Commission
documents. The Code of Conduct provides that "l[t] he public will
have the widest possible access to documents held by the Commission and the Council. , 6 3 However, the Code of Conduct also provides
that the institutions are to refuse access to any document, disclosure of which would undermine specific interests, including the
protection of public and individual interests, and of privacy. Institutions may also deny access to documents in order to protect the institution's interest in the confidentiality of its proceedings.
The Code of Conduct further states that "l[ t] he Commission and
the Council will severally
T64 take steps to implement these principles
before January 1, 1994.
On the same day, December 6, 1993, the
165
Council adopted its rules of procedure by Decision 93/662/EC.
Article 4 of those Rules provides that meetings of the Council are
not to be public except in the cases referred to in Article 6.166 Article 5 provides:
1. Without prejudice to Article 7(5) and other applicable
provisions, the deliberations of the Council shall be covered by the obligation of professional secrecy, except in so
far as the Council decides otherwise....
2. The Council may authorize the production of a copy or
an extract from its minutes for use in legal proceedings.167
Article 9 of the Council's rules of procedures provides, inter
alia, that minutes of Council meetings are generally to indicate, as
to each item on the agenda, the documents submitted to the
Council, the decisions taken or the conclusions reached by the
Council, and the statements made by the Council and those whose
entry has been requested by a Member of the Council or the
161. 1993 O.J. (C 166) 4.
162. Code of Conduct, supra note 155, at 41.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 42.
165. Council Decision of May 31, 1999, adopting the Council's Rules of Procedure (1999/385/EC, ECSC, Euratom), 1993 O.J. (L 304) 1.
166. Id. at 3.
167. Id.
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Commission. 6s Article 22 states: "[t]he detailed arrangements for
public access to Council documents disclosure which is without serious or prejudicial consequences shall be adopted by the Council. ,,169

On December 20, 1993, the Council adopted Decision
93/731/EC on public access to Council documents, 7 0 the aim of
which was to implement the principles established by the Code of
Conduct.'7' Under Article 1 of that decision: "The public shall have
access to Council documents under the conditions laid down in
this Decision...." 7 ' Nevertheless, Article 4(1) of Decision 93/731
provides that:
Access to a Council document shall not be granted where
its disclosure could undermine:
1. The protection of the public interest (public security,
international relations, monetary stability, court proceedings, inspections and investigation),
2. The protection of the individual and of privacy,
3. The protection of commercial and industrial secrecy,
4. The protection of the Community's financial interest,
5. The protection of confidentiality as requested by the
natural or legal person who supplied any of the information contained in the document or has required by the
legislation of 7the Member State which supplied any of that
information.

1

Finally, access to a Council document may be refused in
order to
74
protect the confidentiality of the Council's proceedings.
The Commission is now considering proposed regulations relating to access to documents. Under new Article 255, the Commission is to prepare draft legislation on the general principles and
limits governing the right of access to documents in the three institutions which must be adopted under the code decision procedure

168. Id. at 4-5.
169. Id.
170. Council Decision 93/731/EC , 1993 O.J. (L 340) 43 [hereinafter Decision
93/731].
171. On February 8, 1994, the Commission adopted Decision 94/90 ECSC, EC,
Euratom on public access to Commission documents under the Code of Conduct
Article 1, on the basis of Article 162 of the EC Treaty. 1994 O.J. (L. 46) 58.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 63.
174. Id.
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within two years of the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty,
i.e., before May 1, 2001."' Each institution must also lay down specific provisions regarding access to its documents and its rules of
procedure.1
In drawing up the proposed regulation of the European Parliament under the Council regarding public access to documents,
the Commission has given special consideration to the following:
Member States' legislation on access-to documents, in particular good practice in the Nordic countries, which have
a long tradition of opening up their documents to the
public;
The report by the European Parliaments Committee on
Institutional Affairs on Openness Within the European
Union, adopted by Parliament at is plenary sitting on
January 12, 1999;
The UN/ECE Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation and Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, signed in Arhus Nin June
1998;
The Special Report from the European Ombudsman to
the European Parliament following the own-initiative inquiry into public access to documents held by Community
institutions and bodies;
The Green Paper on public sector information and the
Information Society; and
The "positive experience" from the last five years of operaby the Council,
tion of the system introduced voluntarily
177
the Commission and Parliament.

The new regulation will apply to documents of the European
Parliament, the Council, and the Commission, as well as to their
documents relating to common foreign and security policy, police
and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, and to activities under
ECSC and Euratom Treaties. 7 8 The legislation will cover all documents held by the three institutions, i.e., documents drawn up by

175. Proposal for Regulation Regarding Public Access to Documents of the
European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, Explanatory Memorandum,January 26, 2000, 200/0032 COD (Brussels) at 1.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1-2.
178. Id. at 3; Case 328/85, Deutsch Babcock Handel Gmbh v. Hauptzollamt
Lubeckost, E.C.R. 5119 (1987) (judgment given on December 15, 1987).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2000

27

William
Mitchell LawMITCHELL
Review, Vol. 27,LAW
Iss. 1 [2000],
Art. 22
REVIEW
WILLIAM

[Vol. 27:1

them or emanating from third parties in the possession of the institutions.17 9 This widening in the scope of access is a major step forward compared to the current system, which only covers documents produced by the institutions. Exceptions to production,
however, will still be applicable.
The regulation will attempt to more firmly establish that the
exceptions to the right of access to documents are based on a
"harm test."'' 80 This means that access to documents will be granted
unless disclosure might seriously harm the specific interests set out
in the directives. The regulation is designed to commit the institutions covered by the regulation to take the necessary steps to inform citizens of their rights, set up public registers of documents,
and remind the institutions that they must lay down rules of procedure with specific provisions for both implementation of the genregulation.181
eral piinciples and limits laid down by the
2.

ProceduresFor ObtainingDocuments

The procedures for requesting and obtaining documents under Decision 93/731 are fairly straightforward. Any citizen of a
European Union country can request documents by either writing
directly to the Commission in Brussels or Luxembourg; or to
Commission representatives in Members States or Commission
delegations in nonmember countries.18 The only other guidelines
are that the request should be precise and give as much information as available to identify the document or documents requested.
If additional information about how to obtain access to documents
is needed, one can write to:
The Secretary-General of the European Commission
Unit SG/C/2 Europe and the citizen one
N-9, 2/11
200
Rue de la Loi/Wetstraat
83
D-1049 Brussels'
If documents are produced, they will either be sent to the requestor or the requestor will be offered an appointment to be seen
179. Supra note 175, at 3.
180. Id. at 4.
181. Id.at 5.
at
Guide,
Citizen's
A
Documents,
Commission
to
182 Access
http://europa.eu.int/comm/secretariat-general/sgc/citguide/en/citgul2.htm.
at
183. Id.
23
.htm
http://europa.eu.int/comm/secretariat-general/sgc/citguide/en /citgu
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at the Commission. If there is no possibility for such a visit, you may
be urged to view the documents at the Commission Central Library
in Brussels, Luxembourg, at one of the Commission representations in the Member States, or at a commission delegation in a
nonmember country.14
After application is made, the relevant department of the general secretary will inform applicants in writing within a month that
their application has been approved or that there is an intention to
reject it. In the latter case, the applicant will be informed of the
reasons for this intention and that he or she has one month to
make a confirmatory application for that position to be reconsidered. Failure by the Commission to reply to an application within a
month of submission is deemed a Srefusal,
except where the appli. 185
cant makes a confirmatory application. 18 The rules require that any
decision to reject a confirmatory application should state the
grounds on which it is based and notify the applicant of the decision in writing as soon as possible.
3.

Summary Of Case Law

Case law is beginning to define the parameters of the exceptions to access to documents pursuant to Code of Conduct exceptions
to access to documents. 18 6 The court's decisions illustrate that despite the best intentions of the articulated terms of the transparency policy, the exceptions to disclosure have made it difficult to
obtain documents related to important commission decisions and
the processes by which those decisions are made.
Minimally, however, the published decisions have established
that:
1. Any Member State citizen may request access to any
unpublished documents and is not required to give a
184 Id.
at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/secretariat-general/sgc/citguide/en/citgul 6.htm.
185.

Id.

at

http://europa.eu.int/comm/secretariat-genera/sgc/citguide/en/citgu28.htm.
186. Case T-174/94, Svenska Journalistforbundet v. Council of the European
Union, 3 C.M.L.R 645 (CFI 4th (CHAMBER)1998) (June 17, 1998); Case T610/97R., Hannah Norup Carlsen, v. Council of the European Union, 1998 E.C.J.
Celex LEXIS 5424 (Mar. 3, 1998); Case T-105/95, W.W.F.(U.K.) (World Wide
Fund for Nature) v. E.C. Comm'n, (CFI (4th CHAMBER) 1997) (Denmark), 1997
E.C.R. Celex LEXIS 7276 (Mar. 5, 1997); Case T-194/94, John Carvel and Guardian Newspapers Ltd. v. Council of the European Union, 3 C.M.L.R. 359 (CFI (2d
CHAMBER) 1995) (Denmark), Oct. 17, 1995.
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reason for the request. I
Any person may request access to any unpublished
documents and is not required to give a reason for
the request. 8
The Council is obligated to consider in respect of
each requested document whether, in light of the information available to it, disclosure is likely to undermine one of the exceptions to the general rule al-

lowing access.189
4.

The exceptions should be construed and applied
strictly, in a manner which does not defeat the application of the general rule. In particular, the grounds
for refusing requests for access to Commission
documents, set out in the Code of Conduct as exceptions, should be construed in a manner which will
not render it impossible to obtain the objective of
transparency.

5.

Decisions must discuss specifically why categories of
documents are protected by the public interest exception or there must be a balancing of interests if
the confidentiality of Commission procedures is invoked as a reason for failure to produce documents.
191

There are two primary categories of exceptions to the disclosure of documents: (1) mandatory public interest reasons which include public security, international relations, monetary stability,
court proceedings, inspections and investigations, the protection of
the individual and of privacy, commercial and industrial secrecy
and the Community's financial interests: these relate to the interests of third parties; and (2) protection of the institutions' interest
in the confidentiality of its proceedings, which is discretionary. 19' In
theory, if there is a third-party protectable interest threatened by
production of the documents, the Council must refuse such production, and at the same time explain why such interests are

187.
188.
65.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Case T-105/95, W. WF.(U.K.) 1997 E.C.R. 11-313, 55.
Case T-174/94, SvenskaJournalistforbundet,1995 E.CJ. Celex LEXIS 521,
Id. at 1 117.
Case T-105/95 WWF(UK.), 1997 E.C.R. 11-313, 56.
Id. at 758 - 60.
Case T-174/95, SvenskaJournalistforbundet,at
110-114.
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threatened. 1

When dealing with the discretionary confidentiality aspect of
the decision, the Commission has a duty to undertake a general
balancing of the interests involved as required by the Code of Conduct.194 While the case law does not restrict the breadth of the exceptions in the Code of Conduct in any material way, they do annul
decisions where no proper explanation is provided
or balancing of
95
interests is made by the institution in question.1
The European courts are still attempting to set parameters of
the Transparency Doctrine in the Code of Conduct. Now, however,
the courts will be dealing with a broader regulation which allows
access to third party documents, which should theoretically minimize the mandatory non-production decisions set out in the exceptions. The new regulation, may in fact provide greater access and
minimize the impact of all of the exceptions to the point where the
system operates in a similar fashion to the United States' FOLA.
4. Access To Product Liability Regulatory Decisions
The European Commission and constituent institutions have
several product liability regulatory responsibilities. For example,
the Council directive on General Product Safety sets out specific
Community provisions for safe products and specific rules for national laws of Members States.'9 Therefore, safety standards are a
Union-wide responsibility. In addition, the Product Safety Doctrine
provides for access to its documents in a manner consistent with
the greater Transparency Doctrine.
The Product Safety Directive requires that certain information
relating to the regulation of products must pass from Member
States to the Commission. For example, individual companies must
inform competent authorities as soon as they become aware that a
product they have supplied is dangerous; Member States must
identify authorities competent to monitor the compliance of products; Member States must take measures to inform the Commission
of problems with products; and Member States must report to the
Commission their decisions to restrict the sale of or recall a product.

193.
194.
195.
196.

Id. at 111.
Id. at 113.
WWF.(UK.) v. Councilat 77.
Council Directive 92/59/E.E.C. ofJune 1992 on General Product Safety.
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As for access to documents, Article 12 states that
[t]he Member States and the Commission shall take the
steps necessary to ensure that their officials and agents are
required not to disclose information obtained for purposes of this directive which by its nature is covered by
professional secrecy, except for information relating to
the safety properties of a given product which must be
made public if circumstances so require, in order to protect the health and safety of persons.
The language to Article 12 proposed in December 1999, however, adds that "[a] 11 information available to the authorities of the
Member States or the Commission, related to risk to consumer
health and safety posed by products shall be available to the public
on request.

198

This language clearly is meant to be consistent with the transparency doctrine and access to documents. This is another avenue
by which documents might be obtained regarding the regulation of
products by the European Commission or even potentially Member
States through their various reporting requirements.
IV. CONCLUSION

Agencies that regulate the manufacture of products, both in
the U.S. and in Europe, are often in possession of a treasure trove
of information which product liability litigants might use to support
their claims and defenses. In those cases in which the agency has
conducted an investigation of the very product at issue in the case,
the investigation records, and the personal knowledge possessed by
the agency investigators themselves, might even save the parties
considerable effort and expense, as well as include data and information the parties could not get on their own.199 Regulatory agencies anywhere, however, have a vested interest
in limiting access to much of the information under their control.
The roadblocks to access in the United States and in Europe, however, are weakening. It may be only a matter of time before these
governments' well-worn shields finally give way to full disclosure

197. Id. at. 12.
198. Draft directive replacing Council Directive 92/59/E.E.C., art. 12, on
General Product Safety, December 12, 1999.
199. European Courts have yet to address the issue, whether as a result of a request from a U.S. Court or for its own purposes in the tort litigation context.
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and access to "every man's evidence. 200 In the meantime, litigants
will continue to navigate the obstacle course and hope for the best.

200.

JOHN H. WIGMo1E, 8 EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2192 (John T.

McNaughten ed. rev. 1961).
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